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AN ATTACK ON CONFESSION OF JUDGMENT CLAUSES
IN RESIDENTIAL LEASES THROUGH SECTION
2-302 OF THE UCC
I. INTRODUCTION
Confession of judgment, or cognovit, clauses have been in existence
for quite some time,' but are utilized in only a few jurisdictions. Illinois
has a statute specifically authorizing such clauses 2 and is one of three states3
which produces the vast majority of cognovit judgments in the United
States.
These confession of judgment clauses are predominantly used in rental
agreements in Illinois and cover virtually every apartment rented in Chica-
go. The "dime-store lease", 4 a pre-printed form prepared by the Chi-
cago Real Estate Board, contains a broad confession of judgment clause.5
This provision allows the landlord, through his attorney and without notice,
to represent the tenant in court, to admit the guilt of the tenant for any al-
leged failure to pay rent, and to accept the judge's penalty without argument
or right of appeal. The great majority of apartment dwellers in the Chicago
area are required to sign the standard "dime-store lease" as a take-it-or-
leave-it condition of occupancy, thereby subjecting themselves to judg-
ment by confession, without notice or opportunity to defend themselves. 6
Landlords and rental agencies will generally not negotiate leases, nor will they
allow a tenant to strike any clauses from the leases.
1. For a discussion of historical references, see First Nat'l Bank v. White, 220
Mo. 717, 120 S.W. 36 (1909). Confessions of judgment have long been recognized
at common law. Lock v. Leslie, 248 Ill. App. 438 (1928).
2. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 110, § 50 (1971).
3. Pennsylvania and Ohio are the other two states which lead in the number
of cases involving confessions of judgment. Hopson, Cognovit Judgments: An Ignored
Problem of Due Process and Full Faith and Credit, 29 U. CHI. L. REv. 111, 115 (1961).
4. This standard lease on Form 12R for heated, unfurnished apartments can be
purchased at most stationery and variety stores for twenty-five cents.
5. Paragraph 17 reads as follows:
Tenant . . . irrevocably authorizes any attorney of any court of record
in any State of the United States from time to time to appear for Tenant ...
in such court, to waive process, service, and trial by jury, to confess judg-
ment in favor of Owner . . . and against Tenant . . . for any rent due
hereunder from Tenant to Owner and for Owner's costs and reasonable at-
torney's fees, to waive and release all errors in such proceedings and all right
of appeal and to consent to an immediate execution upon the judgment.
6. Confession of judgment clauses in leases have been held valid by Illinois courts
for the amount of rent due and interest. Fields v. Brown, 188 Ill. 111, 58 N.E. 977
(1901); Scott v. Mantoya, 164 Il. 473, 45 N.E. 977 (1897); Fortune v. Bartolomei,
164 Ill. 51, 45 N.E. 274 (1896); Cutler v. Leader Cleaners, Inc., 12 Ill. App. 2d 439,
139 N.E.2d 832 (1957); Homewood v. Stein, 211 Ill. App. 359 (1918); Bowman v.
Powell, 127 Il. App. 114 (1907); Agnew v. Sexton, 86 I11. App. 274 (1900).
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Confession of judgment clauses have been upheld by the Illinois courts
under various constitutional attacks.7 Although the Uniform Commercial
Code s is not directly applicable to residential leases, this article will attempt
to utilize the principles and expanding case law of the Code to formulate
an alternative argument attacking confession of judgment clauses in the
standard residential lease.
II. THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF CONFESSION OF
JUDGMENT CLAUSES
A. Federal
The United States Supreme Court recently held that a cognovit clause
is not per se violative of fourteenth amendment due process. In D. H.
Overmyer Co. v. Frick Co., the appellant corporation, Overmyer, had
defaulted on payments for equipment being installed by Frick. Overmyer
then made a partial payment and issued an installment note for the balance
due. Frick suggested that this note contain a confession of judgment clause,
but the note as executed contained no such provision. Frick completed the
work, and Overmyer became unable to make further payments on the in-
stallment note. A second note was then negotiated by both parties. This
second note contained a confession of judgment provision, whereby Over-
myer would consent to a judgment obtained by Frick without notice or hear-
ing in the event of default. The cognovit provision was the product of
negotiation between the parties, and Overmyer was fully aware of its in-
clusion in the second note. In consideration for this new note and for
second mortages on Overmyer's property, Frick reduced monthly payments
and interest rates, extended the time for payment, and released mechanic's
liens. Later, Overmyer ceased to make payments on the second note, claim-
ing breach of the original contract. Frick's attorney confessed judgment on
behalf of Overmyer, who was given no notice of the action. Overmyer
then brought suit against Frick, alleging that the entry of judgment pursuant
to the cognovit clause was a violation of the fourteenth amendment. Over-
myer asserted that since due process requires reasonable notice and
an opportunity to be heard, it was unconstitutional to waive in advance the
right to defend in an action on the note. The Supreme Court found that the
confession of judgment provision did not violate due process, since Over-
myer voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently waived its rights to notice and
hearing by approving the cognovit provision with full awareness of the legal
consequences."l
7. See Part IB infra.
8. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE (1972 version) [hereinafter cited as UCC or
CODE]. See generally Note, The Uniform Commercial Code as a Premise for Judicial
Reasoning, 65 COLUM. L. REv. 880 (1965).
9. 405 U.S. 174 (1972). See Young, Cognovit Notes Not Invalid on Their Face,
58 A.B.A.J. 512 (1972).
10. 405 U.S. at 187.
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Although the Court found that Overmyer's waiver was voluntary, know-
ing, and intelligent, it left open to question whether this standard for waiver
should be the test in every commercial case." However, other courts
which have considered the issue of waiver in such cases have required a
showing similar to that used in Overmyer.12
The Court was careful to point out that its holding meant that confes-
sions of judgment are not per se violative of the fourteenth amendment.' 3
The decision was limited to the facts of the particular case, with reliance on
such factors as the equality of bargaining power between the two parties and
the valuable consideration given for the inclusion of the cognovit provision.
Overmyer was a corporation with widespread commerical activities and had
entered into thousands of contracts with contractors such as Frick Company.
As the Court stated, the "agreement, from the start, was not a contract of ad-
hesion. There was no refusal on Frick's part to deal with Overmyer unless
Overmyer agreed to a cognovit,"' 4 and the latter was fully aware of the
inclusion of the provision in the second note. The Court also indicated that
in certain situations, judgments by confession would be violative of due
process. "Our holding . . . is not controlling precedent for other facts of
other cases. For example, where there is great disparity in bargaining pow-
er, and where the debtor receives nothing for the cognovit provision, other
consequences may ensue."'15
Thus, the door is left open in determining the constitutionality of con-
fession of judgment provisions in situations where there is great inequality
in bargaining power between the two parties. The typical residential lease
containing a confession of judgment clause would seem to fall squarely within
such a situation. The tenant is confronted with a take-it-or-leave-it ad-
hesion contract in a market in which all lessors require the same cognovit
waivers, and the tenant has no choice but to assent to the provision if he
wishes to rent an apartment. It seems likely that the lessee's waiver would
not be found to be voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently made, and the
confession of judgment provision could be held to violate due process. 16
11. See 41 U. CIrN. L. REv. 741 (1972).
12. Osmond v. Spence, 327 F. Supp. 1349, 1359 (D. Del. 1971) (knowingly and
intelligently signed); Swarb v. Lennox, 314 F. Supp. 1091, 1095 (E.D. Pa. 1970) (un-
derstanding and voluntary consent); Frantz Tractor Co. v. Wyoming Valley Nursery,
348 Pa. 213, 216, 120 A.2d 303, 305 (1956) (conscious of the fact); Cutler Corp. v.
Latshaw, 374 Pa. 1, 4-5, 97 A.2d 234, 236 (1953) (voluntarily accepted and con-
sciously assumed). See Note, Cognovit Notes: Pretrial Waiver of Constitutional Rights
in Civil Cases, 51 N.C.L. REv. 554 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Note, Cognovit
Notes].
13. 405 U.S. at 187.
14. Id. at 186.
15. Id. at 188. The situation which the Court exempts from its holding is the
typical contract of adhesion.
16. In a companion case to Overmyer, Swarb v. Lennox, 405 U.S. 191 (1972),
while holding that confession of judgment provisions are not per se unconstitutional,
the Court affirmed a lower court ruling that there was no intentional waiver of known
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Lower federal courts have recognized the fact that a tenant does not
voluntarily consent to the provisions of a lease. In two cases involving dis-
traint procedures imposed in adhesion leases, it was concluded that assent
to such provisions in a crowded housing market could not be considered vol-
untary.17 The cases held that the waiver of tenants' rights was invalid and
that the distraint provisions of the Pennsylvania Landlord and Tenant Act
were violative of due process. This is one indication of judicial recognition
of the tenant's plight in that he has virtually no bargaining power or freedom
of contract whatsoever.18
B. Illinois
Confession of judgment clauses have consistently been upheld by Illi-
nois courts.' 9 However, especially in cases involving residential leases,
there are few decisions dealing with the constitutional aspects of cognovit
provisions.
In one fairly recent case, First National Bank in DeKalb v. Keisman,20
involving an attack on the constitutionality of confessions of judgment, the
Illinois Supreme Court held that there was no deprivation of due process or
right to trial because there was nothing in the record to indicate that the
signers did not knowingly and intelligently waive their rights. It is impor-
tant to note, however, that the court stressed the particular facts of the case
before it. The case involved two knowledgeable businessmen and an attor-
ney negotiating an ordinary business loan. The court found no indication
that the men were naive, that they were imposed upon by the lender, or
that they had not agreed to the confession of judgment provision as security
rights by Pennsylvania residents earning less than $10,000 annually in executing con-
tracts containing confession of judgment clauses. The district court held that no judg-
ment by confession could be entered against a member of that class unless it is shown
that the debtor "intentionally, understandingly, and voluntarily" waived his rights. Id.
at 199. This class of debtors can be compared to tenants, since in neither group's
situation is there voluntary consent to the cognovit provisions, nor is there any ability
to bargain.
17. Sellers v. Contino, 327 F. Supp. 230 (E.D. Pa. 1971); Santiago v. McElroy,
319 F. Supp. 284 (E.D. Pa. 1970).
18. "We take judicial notice of the fact that form leases are put before tenants
on an 'accept this or get nothing' basis; . . . and that tenants-who need housing-
are compelled to sign. There is no freedom of contract-there is merely a freedom
to adhere to the terms of the contract written by the landlord." Santiago v. McElroy,
319 F. Supp. 284, 294 (E.D. Pa. 1970). See Note, Cognovit Notes, supra note 12;
Comment, Judgments: The Cognovit Clause and Due Process, 25 U. FLA. L. REV. 376
(1973).
19. Ives v. May, 5 Ill. App. 3d 193, 282 N.E.2d 193 (1972); Grundy County Nat'l
Bank v. Westfall, 125 Il. App. 2d 254, 260 N.E.2d 745 (1970); First Nat'l Bank of
Kirkwood v. Galbraith, 271 Ill. App. 240 (1933). See also cases cited note 6, supra,
involving confession of judgment clauses in leases.
20. First Nat'l Bank in DeKalb v. Keisman, 47 Ill. 2d 364, 265 N.E.2d 662
(1970).
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for the loan. 21 This fact situation is clearly distinguishable from that of the
ordinary tenant, who has no chance to negotiate the terms of a lease and who
generally is unaware of the confession of judgment clause and its legal conse-
quences.
In spite of these suggested constitutional arguments posed in behalf of
tenants, the fact remains that Illinois courts, as well as the United States
Supreme Court, have thus far refused to hold confession of judgment clauses
unconstitutional. Since this approach in attempting to invalidate these
clauses has not yet proven successful, resort could be had to an alternative
argument based upon the provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code.
III. APPLICATION OF THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL
CODE TO LEASES
Article 2 of the Code can be applied to transactions other than those
involving sales. Section 2-102 defines the scope of commercial transactions
covered by the Article: "[T]his Article applies to transactions in goods
... ." The term "transactions in goods" is not defined in the Code, and
it has been said that the reason for this was "to allow the Code to continually
develop and encompass new types of commercial transactions used by busi-
ness."' 22 Further support for this can be found in the Code itself. The Code
is to be "liberally construed and applied to promote its underlying purposes
and policies," 23 which are: "to simplify, clarify and modernize the law
governing commercial transactions" 24 and "to permit the continued expan-
sion of commercial practices through custom, usage, and agreement of the
parties."'25 The drafters also stated that the Code "is intended to make it
possible for the law embodied in this Act to be developed by the courts in
the light of unforseen and new circumstances and practices. 26
It seems clear that a lease would fall within the spirit of the drafters'
intentions, especially since a "transaction" contemplates a much wider scope
of activity than a "sale". 27 The concept of title no longer occupies the
21. Id. at 366-67, 265 N.E.2d at 663. The courts have refused to uphold confes-
sions of judgment for rent accrued after the expiration of the lease term. Weber
v. Powers, 213 Ill. 370, 72 N.E. 1070 (1905); Sibenaller v. Smock, 283 Ill. App. 452
(1936); McFadden v. Lewis, 273 Ill. App. 343 (1934). See also Little v. Dyer, 138
Ill. 272, 27 N.E. 905 (1891).
22. Note, Commercial Transactions: Coverage of Leases Under the UCC, 24
OKLA. L. REV. 475 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Note, Commercial Transactions].
23. UCC § 1-102(1).
24. UCC § 1-102(2) (a).
25. UCC § 1-102(2)(b).
26. UCC § 1-102, Comment 1. See also UCC § 2-313, Comment 2.
27. F. HART & W. WILLIER, FORMS AND PROCEDURES UNDER THE UNIFORM COM-
MERCIAL CODE (1966). The authors point out that since section 2-102 applies to trans-
actions in goods and omits any reference to sales transactions, the Code "should, there-
fore, apply to a lease of goods-a transaction in goods-by the simple construction
of statutory language." See also Hertz Commercial Leasing Corp. v. Transportation
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important position it once held in the commercial world. 28 The commer-
cial leasing business has widely expanded over the years, and as a result,
public policy demands that consumers who lease be given protection equal
to that of those who purchase.2 9 Responsibility for the protection of lessees
must be imposed upon lessors, since they place the object of the transaction
on the market and induce reliance, and since they are better able to bear
any resulting loss. In recent years, courts have begun to expand the appli-
cability of the Code to commercial leases.3 0
Judicial recognition of the applicability of the Code in the area of leases
has been extended to cases involving breach of implied warranties in leases
of chattel or equipment. 3 1  In residential lease cases, courts have recog-
nized common law warranties of habitability and fitness for intended pur-
pose, similar to the implied warranties in the Code.3 2 These warranties are
based in sales and contract law, and many commentators have urged that
the warranty provisions of Article 2 be directly applied to residential leases.33
Credit Clearing House, 59 Misc. 2d 226, 248 N.Y.S.2d 392 (1969), rev'd on other
grounds, 64 Misc. 2d 910, 316 N.Y.S.2d 585; UCC § 2-313, Comment 2.
28. See, e.g., UCC § 9-101, Comment: "Rights, obligations and remedies under the
Article do not depend on the location of title." As stated by the court in Cintrone
v. Hertz Truck Leasing & Rental Serv., 45 N.J. 434, 447, 212 A.2d 769, 776 (1965):
A sale transfers ownership and possession of the article in exchange for
the price; a bailment for hire transfers possession in exchange for the rental
and contemplates eventual return of the article to the owner. By means of
a bailment parties can often reach the same business ends that can be
achieved by selling and buying. The goods come to the user for the time
being and he benefits by their use and enjoyment without the burdens of be-
coming and remaining the owner. The owner-lessor benefits by receiving the
rent for the temporary use.
See also Comment, Implied Warranties of Quality: Protection in Chattel Leases, 1969
U. ILL. L.F. 115 (1969).
29. Sawyer v. Pioneer Leasing Corp., 244 Ark. 943, 428 S.W.2d 46 (1968); W.E.
Johnson Equip. Co. v. United Airlines, Inc., 238 So. 2d 98 (Fla. 1970); Cintrone v.
Hertz Truck Leasing & Rental Serv., 45 N.J. 434, 212 A.2d 769 (1965); Hertz Commer-
cial Leasing Corp. v. Transportation Credit Clearing House, 59 Misc. 2d 226, 298
N.Y.S.2d 392 (1969), rev'd on other grounds, 64 Misc. 2d 910, 316 N.Y.S.2d 585;
Dennis v. Southworth, 467 P.2d 330 (Wash. 1970). See Note, Commercial Transac-
tions, supra note 22.
30. See generally 48 A.L.R.3d 668.
31. Cases cited note 56, infra; KLPR TV, Inc. v. Visual Electronics Corp., 327
F. Supp. 315 (W.D. Ark. 1971), aff'd, 465 F.2d 1382 (8th Cir. 1972); Sawyer v. Pio-
neer Leasing Corp., 244 Ark. 943, 428 S.W.2d 46 (1968); Hertz Commercial Leasing
Corp. v. Transportation Credit Clearing House, 59 Misc. 2d 226, 298 N.Y.S.2d 392
(1969), rev'd on other grounds, 64 Misc. 2d 910, 316 N.Y.S.2d 585; Fairfield Lease
Corp. v. Commodore Cosmetique, Inc., 7 UCC Rep. 164 (Civ. Ct. N.Y. 1969); Vacuum
Concrete Corp. v. Berlanti Constr. Co., 205 Pa. Super. 548, 214 A.2d 729 (1965). See
Farnsworth, Implied Warranties of Quality in Non-Sales Cases, 57 COLUM. L. REV. 656
(1957); Note, The Extension of Warranty Protection to Lease Transactions, 10 B.C.
IND. & CoM. L. REv. 127 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Note, Warranty Protection].
32. UCC §§ 2-314, 2-315.
33. See Murray, Under the Spreading Analogy of Article 2 of the Uniform Com-
mercial Code, 39 FoRD. L. REv. 447 (1971); Note, Warranty Protection, supra note
31; Note, Contract Principles and Leases of Realty, 10 Bos'r. U.L. REv. (1970); Com-
ment, Tenant Remedies-The Implied Warranty of Fitness and Habitability, 16 VrLL.
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In support of this position, reliance has been placed mainly on the official
comment to section 2-313:
Although this section is limited in its scope and direct purpose
to warranties made by the seller to the buyer as a part of a con-
tract for sale, the warranty sections of this Article are not designed
in any way to disturb those lines of case law growth which have
recognized that warranties need not be confined either to sales con-
tracts or to the direct parties to such a contract. They may arise
in other appropriate circumstances such as in the case of bail-
ments for hire, whether such bailment is itself the main contract
or is merely a supplying of containers under a contract for the
sale of their contents a 4
Thus far, however, the courts have been reluctant to hold that the implied
warranties in residential leases are imposed under the Uniform Commercial
Code; rather, they have held that the warranties are based in common law.85
It is submitted, however, that these courts are actually extending the Code
provisions to residential leases by recognizing that leases and sales are
analagous and that lessees require protection as consumers. Although these
courts are holding that the warranties are based in common law, they are
using reasoning analogous to that used under the Code and are finding im-
plied warranties of the same scope as the Code's warranty provisions.
For example, in Lemle v. Breeden,8" the Supreme Court of Hawaii rea-
soned that since a residential lease can be considered a sale,3 7 and since
sales law protects the buyer through implied warranties, an implied war-
ranty should also apply to residential leases:
The application of an implied warranty of habitability in leases
gives recognition to the changes in leasing transactions today. It
affirms the fact that a lease is in essence, a sale as well as a transfer
of an estate in land and is, more importantly, a contractual rela-
tionship. From that contractual relationship an implied war-
ranty of habitability and fitness for purpose intended is a just and
necessary implication. It is a doctrine which has its counterparts
L. REv. 710, 726-27 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Comment, Tenant Remedies]; Note,
The Implied Warranty of Habitability in Landlord-Tenant Relations: A Proposal for
Statutory Development, 12 WM. & MARY L. REv. 580 (1971).
34. UCC § 2-313, Comment 2.
35. Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir. 1970); Lemle v.
Breeden, 51 Hawaii 426, 462 P.2d 470 (1969); Jack Spring, Inc. v. Little, 50 Ill. 2d
351, 280 N.E.2d 208 (1972); Boston Housing Authority v. Hemingway, 293 N.E.2d
831 (Mass. 1973); King v. Moorehead, 495 S.W.2d 65 (Mo. 1973); Marini v. Ireland,
56 N.J. 130, 265 A.2d 526 (1970); Reste Realty Corp. v. Cooper, 53 N.J. 444, 251
A.2d 268 (1969); Mannie Joseph, Inc. v. Stewart, 71 Misc. 2d 160, 335 N.Y.S.2d 709
(Civ. Ct. N.Y. 1972); Amanuensis, Ltd. v. Brown, 65 Misc. 2d 15, 318 N.Y.S.2d 11
(Civ. Ct. N.Y. 1971); Pines v. Perssion, 14 Wis. 2d 590, 111 N.W.2d 409 (1961).
36. 51 Hawaii 426, 462 P.2d 470 (1969).
37. See Lesar, Landlord and Tenant Reform, 35 N.Y.U.L. REv. 1279, 1281
(1960). It has been said that the modem lease is essentially a contract for the pur-
chase of space and services. Schoshinski, Remedies of the Indigent Tenant: Proposal
for Change, 54 GEO. L.J. 519, 535 (1966).
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in the law of sales and torts and one which when candidly counte-
nanced is impelled by the nature of the transaction and contem-
porary housing realities. Legal fictions and artificial exceptions
to wooden rules of property law aside, we hold that in the lease of
a dwelling house . . . there is an implied warranty of habitability
and fitness for the use intended. 38
Similarly, in Jlavins v. First National Realty Corp.,39 the Federal Court of
Appeals for the District of Colombia held that a continuing warranty of
habitability, measured by housing code standards, is implied by operation
of law in residential leases of dwellings and that contract remedies are
available for any breach of the warranty.
In extensive dicta . . . the Javins court argued that a lease con-
tract could be analogized to a sale of goods, and that a tenant,
much like the purchaser of a product, should be assured that the
goods and services which the landlord provides are of adequate
quality.40
Thus, these two decisions, which are landmark cases in the area of implied
warranties in residential leases, indicate the growing judicial opinion that the
principles of consumer protection, as evidenced in the Uniform Commercial
Code, should be extended to tenants.
Therefore, even though the courts have not yet directly held that the
implied warranties in residential leases are imposed under the provisions of
the Code, but rather have only applied the Code's warranty provisions by
analogy, the results are the same. The important thing is that it is the policy
behind the Code's warranty sections which allows the development of a war-
ranty theory in residential lease cases. 41 The public policy considerations
which are the basis of the warranty provisions in the Code are similar to
the public policy considerations involved in the extension of implied war-
ranties to the landlord-tenant situation: one party has induced the other's
reliance on his superior knowledge and skill; the party inducing reliance is
in a better position to know and to control the quality of the product or dwell-
ing; responsibility for defects should be placed on the party who places the
product or dwelling on the market, thus representing its fitness and suitabil-
ity; and that party is in a better position to bear the loss resulting from a
defect. 42 Thus, it is submitted that regardless of the terminology used by the
courts, the warranty provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code are being
applied to residential leases in practice and effect.
Since the tenant is placed in a take-it-or-leave-it situation in the housing
38. 51 Hawaii at 433, 462 P.2d at 474.. .
39. 428 F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
40. Comment, Tenant Remedies, supra note 33, at 720; 428 F.2d at 1079.
41. See Note, Contract Principles and Leases of Realty, 10 BoST. U.L. REV. 24
(1970); Comment, Tenant Remedies, supra note 33.
42. See generally Prosser, The Assault Upon the Citadel (Strict Liability to the
Consumer), 69 YALE L.J. 1099 (1960).
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market, the application of the warranty sections of the Code attempts to as-
sure that the dwelling will be habitable. Clearly, the application of the
Code to residential leases is an attempt to protect the tenant from abuse by
the landlord, who is in a superior bargaining position. Similarly, this under-
lying objective of tenant protection can also be applied to prohibit the use of
confession of judgment clauses by utilizing the unconscionability provision of
the Code.
IV. APPLICATION OF SECTION 2-302 TO LEASES
In the area of disclaimer of warranties, courts have expressly held that
the Code provisions apply directly to commercial leases. In Sawyer v. Pio-
neer Leasing Corp.,43 the Supreme Court of Arkansas held that section
2-316 of the Code, requiring that any exclusion of implied warranties in con-
tracts be conspicuous, was applicable to a lease of an ice machine. 44 The
same Code provision was relied upon by a New York court to invalidate a
contractual disclaimer of warranties in an equipment lease in Hertz Com-
mercial Leasing Corp. v. Transportation Credit Clearing House.4 5 Thus, it
is clear that the warranty and disclaimer provisions of the Code are directly
applicable to commercial leases.
A confession of judgment clause in a residential lease may be viewed
in the same manner as a disclaimer of warranty clause in a commercial
lease. When a seller disclaims a warranty in a commercial lease, the buyer,
in effect, agrees to assume all liability for defects in the product and thereby
forfeits any cause of action which would otherwise grow out of such de-
fects. Similarly, when a lessor inserts a confession of judgment clause in a
residential lease, the lessee gives up all rights to challenge the lessor's cause
of action for an alleged violation of the terms of the lease. The buyer and
the lessee in each situation are waiving any defenses they might have and are
agreeing to allow the seller or lessor to avoid answering any defenses which
would be available if the confession of judgment or disclaimer clause did
not exist.
It has been held that the Code's unconscionability provision, section
2-302, can be used to measure the legal effect to be afforded a disclaimer
43. 244 Ark. 943, 428 S.W.2d 46 (1968). The court based its application of the
Code in this case on the fact that this was a lease which was analogous to a sale;
however, the court did not specify the circumstances under which a lease would be
deemed analogous to a sale.
44. See Note, Uniform Commercial Code-Disclaimer Clause of Implied Warran-
ties Extended to Leases Analogous to Sale, 23 S.W.L.J. 196 (1969); Comment, Applica-
tion of Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code to Leases, 1969 WASH. U.L.Q. 90
(1969).45. 59 Misc. 2d 226, 298 N.Y.S.2d 392 (1969), rev'd on other grounds, 64 Misc.
2d 910, 316 N.Y.S.2d 585. Baker v. Seattle, 79 Wash. 2d 198, 484 P.2d 405 (1971),
also applied section 2-316 to invalidate an inconspicuous disclaimer clause in the lease
of a golf cart./
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clause in a commercial transaction. 4" The unconscionability provision has
been used extensively in the contract of adhesion situation. 47 Since the un-
conscionability section of the Code applies to disclaimers, it must apply to
the Code disclaimer whether it is embodied in a lease or in a contract of sale.
Further, since the purpose of this section is protection of the consumer, and
since the effect of both a disclaimer and a confession of judgment clause is to
allow the seller to escape defenses which could be asserted against him by a
consumer, the unconscionability provision should be equally applicable to
both a commercial and a residential lease.
Section 2-302 of the Uniform Commercial Code 48 provides:
(1) If the court as a matter of law finds the contract or any
clause of the contract to have been unconscionable at the time it
was made the court may refuse to enforce the contract, or it may
enforce the remainder of the contract without the unconscionable
clause, or it may so limit the application of any unconscionable
clause as to avoid any unconscionable result.
(2) When it is claimed or appears to the court that the con-
tract or any clause thereof may be unconscionable the parties shall
be afforded a reasonable opportunity to present evidence as to its
commercial setting, purpose and effect to aid the court in making
the determination.
Although the term "unconscionable" is not defined in the Code, the official
comments to the section state the basic test:
[W]hether, in light of the general commercial background and
the commercial needs of the particular trade or case, the clauses
involved are so one-sided as to be unconscionable under the circum-
stances existing at the time of the making of the contract ....
The principle is one of the prevention of oppression and unfair
surprise.49
This two-part test of prevention of oppression and unfair surprise is satisfied
even if only one of the elements is present in a case. This test was discussed
at length in the landmark case of Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture
Co.:10 "Unconscionability has generally been recognized to include an ab-
sence of meaningful choice on the part of one of the parties together with
contract terms which are unreasonably favorable to the other party." 51 Re-
ferring to oppression, the court went on to say: "In many cases the mean-
46. Hawkland, Limitation of Warranty Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 11
HowARD L.J. 28, 34-37 (1965); Moye, Exclusion and Modification of Warranty Un-
der the UCC-How to Succeed in Business Without Being Liable for Not Really Trying,
46 DENVER L.J. 579, 614-17 (1969).
47. Id.
48. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 26, § 2-302 (1971).
49. UCC § 2-302, Comment 1. See Note, Unconscionability-The Code, the
Court and the Consumer, 9 B.C. IND. & COM. L. REv. 367 (1967-68) [hereinafter
cited as Note, Unconscionability].
50. 121 U.S. App. D.C. 315, 350 F.2d 445 (1965).
51. Id. at 449.
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ingfulness of the choice is negated by a gross inequality of bargaining power.
The manner in which the contract was entered is also relevant to this con-
sideration." 52  The court then discussed unfair surprise: "Did each party
to the contract. . . have a reasonable opportunity to understand the terms of
the contract, or were the important terms hidden in a maze of fine print
and minimized by deceptive sales practices?" 53
Section 2-302 should be extended to all lease transactions since the
policy underlying the doctrine of unconscionability is common to all con-
tracts. 54  Many commentators have advocated the application of section
2-302 to situations arising outside the scope of Article 2,15 and the courts
have recently begun to recognize this extension of the Code to cases involv-
ing leases.56 The majority of these cases have involved exculpatory clauses,
protecting one party to the contract from liability for his acts of negligence
causing injury to the other party. The courts have refused to give effect to
these exculpatory clauses in most cases, holding them to be unconscionable.
In Weaver v. American Oil Co.,57 the Indiana Supreme Court held
that a provision in a service station lease which exculpated and indemni-
fied the lessor was unconscionable due to the lessee's lack of knowledge of
his potential liability and to the inequality of bargaining power between the
parties. In this case, the exculpatory provision was used to attempt to relieve
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. See 5A A. CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 1164 (1964):
Where this section [2-3021 is made applicable to contracts for the sale of
goods, no court should fail to make it applicable to all other contracts; for
the policy that it adopts is applicable to all alike. In all cases alike, it puts
upon the court the responsibility of determining the degree of unconscion-
ability and the requirement of "justice".
55. See, e.g., Bolgar, The Contract of Adhesion: A Comparison of Theory and
Practice, 20 AMER. J. COMP. L. 53, 70 (1972); Cramer, Extension of the Uniform Com-
mercial Code's Unconscionable Contract Provision to Exculpatory Lease Clauses, 5
AMER. Bus. L.J. 297, 291-92 (1967); Ellinghaus, In Defense of Unconscionability, 78
YALE L.J. 757, 808-12 (1969); Wilson, Freedom of Contract and Adhesion Contracts,
14 INT'L & CoMP. L.Q. 172, 187-88; Note, The Uniform Commercial Code as a Premise
for Judicial Reasoning, 65 CoLUM. L. REV. 880, 891-92 (1965); Comment, The Uniform
Commercial Code's Solution For Unconscionable Contracts, 48 ORE. L. REV. 209, 212-
13 (1969); Comment, The Doctrine of Unconscionability, 19 U. ME. L. REV. 81, 86-
91 (1967); Note, Exculpatory Clauses in Standard Form Leases: A Need for Direct
Judicial Action, 28 U. PIrr L. REV. 85, 95-96 (1966); Note, Unconscionable Sales
Contracts and the Uniform Commercial Code, Section 2-302, 45 VA. L. REV. 583, 590-91
(1959); Note, Commercial Decency and the Code-The Doctrine of Unconscionability
Vindicated, 9 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1143, 1160-61 (1961).
56. Fairfield Lease Corp. v. Pratt, 6 Conn. Cir. Ct. 537, 9 UCC Rep. 202 (1971)
(lease of vending machines); United States Leasing Corp. v. Franklin Plaza Apart-
ments, Inc., 8 UCC Rep. 1026 (Civ. Ct. N.Y. 1971) (lease of equipment); Fairfield Lease
Corp. v. George Umbrella Co., 8 UCC Rep. 184 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. 1970) (lease of vend-
ing machines); Electronics Corp. of America v. Lear Jet Corp., 55 Misc. 2d 1066, 286
N.Y.S.2d 711 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. 1967) (lease of aircraft); Fairfield Lease Corp. v. Colonial
Aluminum Sales, Inc., 3 UCC Rep. 858 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. 1966) (lease of real estate);
Baker v. Seattle, 79 Wash. 2d 198, 484 P.2d 405 (1971).
57. 276 N.E.2d 144 (Ind. 1971). See also 6 bIn. L. REV. 108 (1972).
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the oil company of liability when its employee sprayed gasoline on the lessee
and his employee, causing them to be burned when the gas ignited. The
lease had been prepared by attorneys for the oil company, and the agents of
that company never attempted to explain the conditions of the lease, nor
did they advise the lessee to consult a lawyer before signing. The signing
of the lease was merely ceremonious, and the procedure was the same each
year. The agent would put the lease in front of the lessee and tell him to
sign, which he did. There was nothing in the record to indicate that the
lessee ever read the lease, that the agent asked him to read it, or that the
agent called his attention to the exculpatory clause. While the court specif-
ically based its holding on the ground that the clause contravened public
policy, it premised its reasoning on section 2-302 of the Code. The court
stated:
IT]he party seeking to enforce such a contract has the burden of
showing that the provisions were explained to the other party and
came to his knowledge and there was in fact a real and voluntary
meeting of the minds and not merely an objective meeting.5s
(Emphasis in original.)
It is submitted that this same reasoning can be applied to confession of
judgment clauses in residential leases. The following statement by one com-
mentator concerning the unconscionability of exculpatory clauses in leases
can be directly analogized to cognovit clauses:
[I]n those cases where the exculpatory clause is raised as a de-
fense to an action brought under a lease, the Court should use
Sec. 2-302 of the Uniform Commercial Code as a guide and con-
sider the validity of the exculpatory clause by making a factual de-
termination as to whether the contract was one of adhesion or
actually "bargained out" and freely agreed to, whether the tenant
had a meaningful choice by reason of bargaining power or avail-
able alternatives of entering or refusing the lease, and whether the
exculpatory provision is so extreme and one-sided as to be un-
conscionable according to the mores and business practices of the
time and place.59
Confession of judgment clauses have been held by at least one court to
be unconscionable under section 2-302, based on its tests of oppression and
unfair surprise. In Architectural Cabinets, Inc. v. Gaster,60 the defendant,
who was a general contractor and partner in ownership of an apartment
complex, placed several orders with the plaintiff, a manufacturer of kitchen
equipment. Each of the plaintiff's order forms which the defendant signed
58. 276 N.E.2d at 148. In Baker v. Seattle, 79 Wash. 2d 198, 484 P.2d 405
(1971), section 2-316(2) was applied by analogy, and the court held unconscionable
an inconspicuous disclaimer clause under which the lessor of a golf cart sought to avoid
liability for injuries sustained by a lessee when the brakes failed and the cart over-
turned.
59. Cramer, supra note 55, at 292.
60. 291 A.2d at 298 (Del. 1971).
CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW
contained a confession of judgment clause. Upon defendant's default in
payment, the plaintiff entered judgments by confession. The defendant then
moved for an order vacating the confessed judgments, alleging that the con-
fession of judgment clauses were unconscionable within the meaning of sec-
tion 2-302 of the Code. The court agreed that the validity of a confession
of judgment clause could be measured by the tests of section 2-302 by stating:
Because a warrant of attorney authorizing judgment operates in
such a one-sided way, the maner in which it appears in a con-
tract may constitute unfair surprise or make it unconscionably op-
pressive within the meaning of § 2-302.61
Since the confession of judgment clause was neither separated from the other
provisions of the agreement nor inserted in such a way as to draw special
attention to it, the court held that the clause caused unfair surprise in the
manner in which it appeared and that it was unconscionable. 2
The Architectural Cabinets court also alluded to the requirement that
a confession of judgment clause be "voluntarily accepted and consciously
assumed."'63 This standard coincides with that enunciated by the Supreme
Court in Overmyer. There must be a clear manifestation of consent by the
party signing the form, or agreement to the confession of judgment clause
itself.64 This stringent requirement is necessary due to the public policy
considerations which weigh against confession of judgment clauses. These
considerations were summarized by one court as follows:
A warrant of attorney authorizing judgment is perhaps the most
powerful and drastic document known to civil law. The signer
deprives himself of every defense and every delay of execution,
he waives exemption of personal property from levy and sale under
the exemption laws, he places his cause in the hands of a hostile
defender. The signing of a warrant of attorney is equivalent to
a warrior of old entering a combat by discarding his shield and
breaking his sword. For that reason the law jealously insists on
proof that this helplessness and impoverishment was voluntarily
accepted and consciously assumed. 65
Courts should subject confession of judgment clauses to an active review
under the Code's test for unconscionability and recognize that the necessary
consent or agreement could only occur with a commercial lease.
The residential lease situation would seem to compel a finding of un-
conscionability under section 2-302 since oppression and unfair surprise are
so prevalent in this area. "Unfair surprise occurs as a result of the non-
drafting party having been unaware at the time the contract was entered
61. Id. at 300.
62. Id. at 301.
63. Id.
64. Egyptian Sands Real Estate, Inc. v. Polony, 222 Pa. Super. 315, 294 A.2d
799 (1972).
65. Cutler Corp. v. Latshaw, 374 Pa. 1, 4-5, 97 A.2d 234, 236 (1953).
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into that certain harsh and burdensome conditions exist in the contract.166
Surely the great majority of lessees do not realize what liability and waiver
they are subjecting themselves to when they sign a form lease containing
a confession of judgment provision, nor are many of them even aware that
such a provision is in the lease. Clearly, a lessee in such a situation is not
"consciously assuming" the ramifications of the confession of judgment clause.
Further, the confession of judgment clause operates to cause the same unfair
surprise as in Architectural Cabinets due to the manner in which it appears.
Tenants have no choice but to sign the standard form if they wish to rent an
apartment, and few take the trouble to read all the fine print on the form.
It would make no difference whether they read the lease, since any objec-
tion they might raise would be ignored by the landlord. Even if tenants are
aware of the existence of the cognovit clause, very few would understand
what it means and would not comprehend its potential legal consequences. 67
The principle of oppression arises in the residential situation as a result of the
tenant's lack of any real bargaining power, rendering him unable to alter the
terms of the lease. The tenant either takes the lease as is or leaves it, and
the odds are overwhelming that he will be confronted with that same exact
lease if he attempts to rent any other apartment in the Chicago area.
68
Also, the concept of oppression encompasses the imposition of unreasonably
harsh contractual provisions. Clearly, a provision which subjects a tenant to
a judgment by confession with no notice or opportunity to be heard could
be considered oppressive in every sense of the word.
This note does not mean to suggest that once a court finds the con-
fession of judgment clause in a residential lease unconscionable it should
declare the entire lease to be unconscionable. It is submitted that this sug-
gested use of section 2-302 should be applied only to the confession of judg-
66. Note, Unconscionability, supra note 49, at 368. See, e.g., Williams v.
Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 121 U.S. App. D.C. 315, 350 F.2d 445 (1965).
67. In Egyptian Sands Real Estate, Inc. v. Polony, 222 Pa. Super. 315, 294 A.2d
799 (1972), the court gave special attention to the lessees' understanding of the con-
fession of judgment clause in holding that there was not a sufficient level of consent.
The lessees had only been in the United States for twelve years prior to signing the
lease and had no formal training in English, and the lessor had convinced them to
use his attorney instead of outside counsel. The lessees admitted that they had not
read the small paragraphs of the lease, but stated that they would not have understood
them even if they had read them. The average lessee is really in no better position.
Typically, a lessee will only be concerned with the items typed into the form lease,
such as the term, amount of rent, and special features.
68. In the leading pre-Code case of Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32
N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960), the court used the Code concept of unconscionability
to void a standard disclaimer used in the automobile industry. The court noted that
no buyer could purchase an automobile produced by the Automobile Manufacturers As-
sociation, which covered virtually all passenger cars produced, without accepting the
standard disclaimer. The court was influenced by the imposition on the entire buying
public of this disclaimer, but finally held the disclaimer unconscionable due to the sur-
prise results it created. Either basis of the holding would apply with equal force to
the confession of judgment clauses used in virtually every apartment lease in Chicago.
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ment clause itself. The court may then declare the confession of judgment
clause unconscionable and, under section 2-302(1), leave the remainder of
the lease undisturbed and in effect. This would leave the lessor with a right
to pursue his remedies for the alleged breach of the lease, although he could
no longer confess judgment by warrant of attorney.
One further limitation upon the application of section 2-302 to confes-
sion of judgment clauses in leases is that not every confession of judg-
ment clause will be unconscionable. If a landlord negotiates with a
tenant, and through this bargaining process the confession of judgment clause
is included in the lease, then it may no longer be unconscionable. It is sub-
mitted, however, that the lessee must still specifically consent to the inclusion
of the cognovit clause and have actual knowledge of its purpose and effect,
which could not occur with a residential lease due to the tenant's inadequate
bargaining position and lack of legal expertise.
V. CONCLUSIONS AND PROPOSALS
While most states have either abolished or severely limited the use of
confession of judgment clauses, 69 Illinois is one of a few states which still
utilizes them extensively. Since constitutional attacks on such clauses have
thus far failed in this state, an alternative argument based on the Uniform
Commercial Code is an approach that may be successful in invalidating
cognovit clauses in residential leases. The Code's warranty provisions
have been extended to residential leases, which illustrates that the courts
recognize the great need for tenant protection. A strong argument can be
made in favor of extending the unconscionability doctrine of the Code to
protect tenants from the legal consequences of confession of judgment
clauses, considering factors such as: the unalterable form lease, its wide-
spread use, the lack of the tenant's bargaining power, the take-it-or-leave-it
condition of renting, the tenant's lack of understanding as to what the cognovit
clause means, and the potential inherent abuse of such a clause. 70
A bill currently under study in the Illinois House of Representatives
proposes comprehensive legislation to improve the legal standing of tenants
and to correct the legal imbalance between landlords and tenants, exempli-
fied by the "dime-store lease".7 2  The proposed Residential Landlord and
69. E.g., ALA. CODE, tit. 20, § 16 and tit. 62, § 248 (1958); ARIz. REV. STAT.
ANN. §§ 6-629, 44-143 (Supp. 1972); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 55.05 (1971); MASS. GEN.
LAWS ch. 231, § 13A (1959). For a complete listing of the applicable statutes, see
Note, A Clash in Ohio?: Cognovit Notes and the Business Ethic of the UCC, 35 U.
CIN. L. REV. 470, 490-91 (1966).
70. 'The fact that courts will freely and almost automatically open up a con-
fession of judgment hardly shows that the system works fairly. Rather, it indicates
that the trial court judges feel that the system is inherently subject to abuse." Hopson,
supra note 3, at 123 n.71.
71. H.B. 1345, 78th Gen. Assem. (1973-74).
72. Chicago Tribune, October 7, 1973, § 1, at 50, col. 1.
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Tenant Act would, among other things, prohibit confession of judgment
clauses, requirements that tenants pay landlords' legal fees, waiver of ten-
ants' rights under the Act, and exculpatory provisions protecting the land-
lord from liability. 73 This indicates that the legislature is attempting to un-
dertake what the courts have failed to do, namely, to provide protection for
tenants. However, it is doubtful that the bill can be passed within the next
two years, so it is imperative that some judicial relief be provided by pro-
hibiting confession of judgment clauses in residential leases. Thus, the ten-
ant's burden could be eased through the application of section 2-302 of the
Uniform Commercial Code to residential leases.
PATRICIA J. WHITTEN
73. Section 1.403. Prohibited Provisions in Rental Agreements. (a) No
agreement may provide that the tenant:
(1) agrees to waive or to forgo rights or remedies under this Act;
(2) authorizes any person to confess judgment on a claim arising
out of the rental agreement;
(3) agrees to pay the landlord's attorneys fees; or;
(4) agrees to the exculpation or limitation of any liability of the
landlord arising under law or to indemnify the landlord for that liability or
the costs connected therewith.
(b) A provision prohibited by subsection (a) included in a rental agree-
ment is unenforceable. If a landlord deliberately uses a rental agreement
containing provisions known by him to be prohibited, the tenant may recover
actual damages sustained by him and not more than 3 months periodic rent
and reasonable attorneys fees.
